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This paper analyzes collective decision making when individual preferences evolve through
learning. Votes are aﬀected by their anticipated eﬀect on future preferences. The analysis is
conducted in a two-arm bandit model with a safe alternative and a risky alternative whose
payoﬀ distribution, or “type”, varies across individuals and may be learned through exper-
imentation. Society is shown to experiment less than any of its members would if he could
dictate future decisions, and to be systematically biased against experimentation compared
to the utilitarian optimum. Control sharing can even result in negative value of experimen-
tation: society may shun a risky alternative even its expected payoﬀ is higher than the safe
one’s. Commitment to a ﬁxed alternative can only increase eﬃciency if aggregate uncertainty
is small enough. Even when types are independent, a positive news shock for anyone raises
everyone’s incentive to experiment. Ex ante preference correlation or heterogeneity reduces
these ineﬃciencies.
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comments.1 Introduction
The positive social choice literature usually assumes that individuals perfectly know their own
preferences. In reality, preferences may evolve through learning. For example, a reform may have
uncertain consequences, which can only be learned by experimenting with that reform. Similarly,
decisions in committees are often analyzed under the assumption that payoﬀ distributions are
perfectly known to committee members at the time of their decisions, although this is rarely the
case in practice. This diﬀerence is important if those decisions are made repeatedly, because
one’s vote at any given time must take into account the impact of elected decisions on everyone’s
future preferences, willingness to experiment, and votes.
This paper analyzes how experimentation - the fact that an alternative with comparatively lower
immediate expected payoﬀ is chosen to learn more about its value - is aﬀected by the nature
and amount of individual control over collective decisions. The main analysis is conducted in
a two-arm bandit model in which a “safe” alternative yields a constant, homogeneous payoﬀ to
all and a “risky” alternative yields payoﬀs according to some distribution, or type, which varies
across individuals. At any time, society elects one of the two actions according to some voting
rule. Individuals may learn their type through experimentation with the risky alternative.1 The
paper ﬁrst analyzes a setting in which each individual’s type is either “good” or “bad” and gets
revealed according to a particular process of news arrival that is simple enough to provide many
results and their intuition. The question is then reformulated as an abstract stochastic control
problem allowing to extend several results to arbitrary news arrival processes. Several news
arrival processes are considered in turn, with an increasing degree of complexity and nuance in
the results.
A key feature of the model is the feedback eﬀect occurring between individual preferences and
collective decisions. Not only does preference uncertainty aﬀect society’s choices, but the reverse
is also true. This social phenomenon has been described in the context of conservatism by
Kuran (1988):
(...) a complete model for the study of conservatism would have a circular dynamic structure,
with individuals’ choices driven by their beliefs and preferences; society’s choices generated by its
1Focusing on two actions gets rid of Condorcet cycles and ensures robustness of the equilibrium concept used
in the analysis. Section 13 studies an example with three actions where learning is correlated across actions.
2members’ choices; and, completing the circle, these members’ beliefs and preferences inﬂuenced by
society’s choices. It would thus incorporate three interactive processes: that by which individuals’
seek and integrate information to form their beliefs and preferences regarding the alternatives they
face; that by which society combines these choices to select policies, institutions, and technologies;
and ﬁnally, that by which collective outcomes mold individuals’ beliefs and preferences. (...) the aim
of theoretical analysis on the subject should be to elucidate these three processes with an eye toward
deriving propositions as to when, how, and to what extent individuals and collectivities adapt to
changes in environmental factors.
The ﬁrst and most general result of this paper is that sharing control always reduces the value
of experimentation compared to an equivalent single decision maker setting. In some cases,
the value of experimentation can be negative, meaning that society may reject a new alternative
with a higher expected payoﬀ than the current alternative. This latter result may be surprising.2
Many economic ﬁelds use the concept of a positive “option value,” which captures a decision
maker’s ability to react to news.3 In all these cases, the ability to make a decision upon learning
some payoﬀ-relevant information amounts to a positive “option value.” When decisions are made
collectively this ability should intuitively persist, if weaker, as long as each individual has some
control over collective decisions. Contrary to this intuition, the paper shows that, even when
voter types are independently distributed and voters have identical voting weight, the value of
experimentation can be negative. This phenomenon can only occur in truly dynamic settings,
as it is caused by adverse duration of experimentation. This can be explained as follows:4 good
news for one voter increases other voters’ risk of being imposed the risky action in the future,
as that voter is more likely to support it. Bad news, on the other hand, reduces that risk,
making experimentation relatively more appealing to other voters. Experimentation duration
may thus create some endogenous adversity of the equilibrium voting policy against all voters.
This phenomenon can occur with as few as three individuals, and is more likely to occur when
learning is slow, i.e. when the time cost of experimentation is high.
Control sharing eﬀects may be decomposed into a loser trap risk: society imposes the risky
action to a bad-type individual, and a symmetric winner frustration risk: society imposes the
safe action to a good-type individual. The relative strength of these risks helps understand the
2The result does not rely on commitment ability or on asymmetric information. It is purely due to control
sharing eﬀects, as shown here and in Section 11.
3In ﬁnance, the exercise a (European) stock option depends on the observation of stock price at maturity,
giving the option its strictly positive value. Similarly, real options were introduced by Myers (1977) to model
discretionary investment of ﬁrms in response to growth opportunities. In corporate ﬁnance, Leland (1994) and
a growing literature model bankruptcy events as an endogenous decision of shareholders prompting them to
postpone default even when interest payments exceed incoming cash ﬂows.
4A clearer intuition, requiring more buildup, is presented in Section 11.
3eﬀect on experimentation of news shocks, group size, and the quorum required in supermajority
or q-rules, among other things. For example, only the loser trap may arise when learning is
inﬁnitely fast, so that experimentation entails no time cost. Given the possibility of immediate
revelation of everyone’s type, society may still reject the risky action, provided that the risk
of loser trap is high enough. As group size goes to inﬁnity, voters behave myopically if types
are independent. Intuitively, individual control over future decisions is inﬁnitely diluted, which
annihilates individual value of experimentation. This intuition is only partially correct however,
as experimentation is not monotonically decreasing with respect to group size: the addition of
new voters reduces the risk of winner frustration, an eﬀect that may locally dominate.
In the benchmark setting, if an individual’s type is good, the risky alternative pays him some
lump-sums at exponentially distributed times. If his type is bad, the risky action pays him
nothing. Therefore, an individual knows for sure that his type is good as soon as he receives
a lump-sum (he is then a “sure winner”), but remains “unsure” about his type otherwise.
Experimenting with the risky action results in a better assessment of individual valuations for
that action, hence a better knowledge of individual rankings of alternatives.
In this setting, society experiments too little compared to the utilitarian policy.5,6 This result
stems from two eﬀects. A social planner, having full control over decisions, can always exploit
whatever information is revealed through experimentation, whereas individuals are constrained
by control sharing.7 This makes, other things equal, experimentation more attractive for him
than it does for any individual subject to majority voting. Moreover, whenever a majority of
unsure voters imposes the safe action, it ignores the utility of sure winners, unlike a utilitarian
social planner. If one reverses the benchmark setting, as in Section 10, so that negative lump-
sums reveal sure losers and the safe action entails a small cost for unsure voters, the direction
of the second eﬀect is reversed. This reversal generates two experimentation regimes, one with
too little experimentation (society simply rejects the risky alternative), the other with too much
experimentation (the majority ignores sure losers’ welfare), compared to the utilitarian optimum.
Comparison with the utilitarian optimum can be reinterpreted in terms of commitment. If indi-
viduals are ex ante identical - placed behind a veil of ignorance - and able to commit at the outset
5The comparison is based on simple majority voting, though the argument can be generalized.
6Throughout the paper, experimenting “less” or “too little” or “too short” means that the domain of beliefs
under which society picks the risky action is smaller or too small compared to some reference such as the utilitarian
criterion.
7In that respect, the main analysis assumes that individual payoﬀs are publicly observed. Section 13 considers
the case of privately observed payoﬀs and shows that the voting equilibrium derived in the benchmark setting
with publicly observed payoﬀs is truthful.
4to some (anonymous) policy, they choose the utilitarian policy. Indeed, their expected utilities
are identical and proportional to utilitarian welfare. Therefore, collective experimentation lasts
longer if individuals can initially commit to a state-dependent policy. If, however, the only form
of commitment available is with respect to a ﬁxed action rather to a state-dependent policy,
there is a trade-oﬀ between value of commitment and value of experimentation. Imposing an
action ex ante introduces rigidity which prevents society from exploiting incoming information.
Such commitment can only increase eﬃciency if aggregate uncertainty is low enough. Section 6
suggests further interpretations of these results in terms of decision frequency and delegation.
In light of the above results, it is tempting to shift to a normative analysis and ask whether
some voting rules are systematically more eﬃcient than others. For example, if the risky action
requires unanimity, the risk of loser trap disappears. However, this very fact also makes exper-
imentation less attractive: winners are less likely to enjoy the risky action in the long run, for
this would require that all society members turn out to be winners. The unanimity rule thus
exacerbates winner frustration.8 Whatever control is gained from being able to veto the risky
action is balanced by a control loss for enforcing that same action. Examples indeed show that
with the unanimity rule, experimentation may last longer or shorter than under the majority
rule.
Another key issue concerns the impact of news arrival on incentives and welfare. With indepen-
dent types, incoming news for an individual brings no information externality on other voters.
However, it creates a payoﬀ externality as it aﬀects that individual’s voting decisions. What is
the direction of this payoﬀ externality? In the benchmark setting, good news for any individual
is good news for all, and prompts society to experiment more. This result may seem counter-
intuitive: the occurrence of a new winner brings unsure voters closer to the brink, where the
risky action is imposed on them forever. However, it also makes unsure voters more likely to
enjoy the risky action if they turn out to be winners, an eﬀect that must dominate whenever
society experiments in the ﬁrst place and experimentation is contingent on the arrival of such
positive news shocks.
The severity of control sharing eﬀects diminishes if types are positively correlated. Correlation
also allows individuals to learn from one another’s payoﬀs and thus reduces the time cost of
experimentation. This observation is particularly relevant for large societies composed of groups
with high intra-group correlation.
8More generally, loser trap becomes weaker and winner frustration stronger as the number of voters required
to implement the risky action increases.
5An abstract formulation of the model as a general stochastic control problem makes it possible
to prove some of the above results without specifying particular dynamics or direction for news
arrival. The analysis introduces a collective version of the Gittins index, which provides a
simple mathematic language to prove that collective experimentation is always shorter than
what any individual would choose with dictatorial power. Provided that, for any individual, the
risky action is more likely to be implemented if that individual beneﬁts from it than otherwise,
there is always some experimentation in equilibrium, i.e. a domain of beliefs where the risky
action’s expected payoﬀ is lower than the safe action’s for a decision number of individuals
who nevertheless prefer to impose the risky action. Requiring unanimity for the risky action
guarantees such non-adversity.
The issues described so far are concerned with how control sharing aﬀects learning and experi-
mentation. The paper brieﬂy considers a dual question: how does the possibility that individual
rankings of social alternatives evolve through learning, potentially resulting in majority shifts,
aﬀect collective decisions? In an example with multiple risky actions, Section 13 shows that even
a slight risk of preference modiﬁcation through learning can result in equilibrium breakdowns.
Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents a simple example and potential
applications. Section 4 analyzes the benchmark setting with simple majority voting and inde-
pendent types. Section 5 compares voting-based experimentation to the utilitarian optimum.
Section 6 considers various forms of commitment. Section 7 compares eﬃciency of various voting
rules. Section 8 analyzes the eﬀect of voter heterogeneity and correlation on experimentation.
Section 9 formulates the model as an abstract stochastic control problem and extends several
results to general news arrival processes. Sections 10 and 11 respectively analyze the cases
of negative and mixed news shocks and show how the results are modiﬁed in these settings.
Section 12 considers the case of privately observed payoﬀs. Section 13 discusses and relaxes
some assumptions of the model, and in particular allows for multiple risky actions. Section 14
concludes.
2 Related Literature
The present analysis contributes to the literature on collective conservatism. In contrast to
earlier literature, it does not rely on arguments such as exogenous transaction costs or sunk
costs or bounded rationality as surveyed by Kuran (1988). The form of conservatism studied
here is closely related to Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), who were the ﬁrst to explain status
6quo bias as a consequence of uncertainty about winner identity. In their setting, however,
there is no aggregate uncertainty (the utilitarian optimum is known from the beginning) and
no experimentation, since whatever individuals learn about their type in the ﬁrst period has no
impact on the collective decision of the second period.9 Explicitly considering such possibilities
raises numerous issues tackled in the present paper.
The paper also contributes to a developing literature on games and experimentation, in which
conservatism may arise as a consequence of strategic information acquisition.10 Those papers
identify an informational free-riding problem in settings where agents can experiment individ-
ually with some risky action to learn about its common value. The present paper considers a
reverse setting, in which a single collective action is made at any time, but the value of the
action may vary across individuals. The analysis of the benchmark setting owes conceptual and
technical clarity to the use of exponential bandits, building on Keller Rady and Cripps (2005).11
The paper a burgeoning literature analyzing collective search in various settings (Albrecht,
Andersen, Vroman (2007), Compte and Jehiel (2008), and Messner and Polborn (2008)). In these
models a group must choose, at any time, between accepting some outstanding proposal or trying
a new proposal with iid characteristics (Messner and Polborn also discuss correlation across the
two periods of their setting). Compte and Jehiel show in particular that more stringent majority
requirements select more eﬃcient proposals but take more time to do so. Albrecht et al. ﬁnd
that committees are more permissive than a single decision maker facing an otherwise identical
search problem. In those papers, committees never return to past proposals. In contrast, the
present work focuses on social and individual learning and experimentation when voter types
for a given action are lasting and permanently inﬂuence collective decisions.
9The reference against which conservatism is established is also diﬀerent. Their main result is that society can
reject some risky alternative which would gain the majority if types were revealed. However, society does choose
the utilitarian optimum.
10See Bolton and Harris (1999), D´ ecamps and Mariotti (2004) and Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005), and
Li (2001).
11Exponential bandits were introduced by Presman and Sonin (1990) and used in economics by Malueg
and Tsutsui (1997), Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2001), D´ ecamps and Mariotti (2004) and Keller, Rady, and
Cripps (2005).
73 Example and Applications
3.1 A Simple Example
Three friends, Ann, Bob, and Chris, go to a restaurant once every week-end. Each week-end,
they choose their restaurant using the simple majority rule. A new restaurant has just opened.
Should the friends try it? Do they try it? Suppose the alternative is a restaurant that gives
utility 1 to all. For each voter, the new restaurant can be either bad (yielding 0 utility) or good
(yielding utility u > 1). Suppose that preferences, or “types” are independently distributed
across friends (e.g. Ann is no more or less like likely to appreciate the new restaurant if Bob
likes it, etc.), with both types having an ex ante probability of 1/2.
Immediate Full Type Revelation Suppose that, if they try this new restaurant, all voters
immediately learn their type. With probability 1/8, Ann and Bob will like it but Chris won’t.
In this case, Chris is trapped into always returning to that restaurant, as Ann and Bob have
the majority. This situation will be referred to as the “loser trap”. Also with probability 1/8,
Chris is the only one who turns out to like the restaurant, but is blocked from exploiting this
discovery for future dinners by Ann and Bob. This symmetric situation will be referred to as
“winner frustration”. Overall, there is a probability 1/4 that Chris loses control over the decision
process, compared to the situation in which he could choose the restaurant by himself in the
future. Depending on u and on how time is discounted, these control-loss eﬀects may be such
that Chris and, by symmetry, all voters prefer not to try the new restaurant even though each
of them would have preferred to try it if he had full control over future decisions.
Gradual Type Revelation Now suppose that a voter likes the new restaurant if and only
if he ﬁnds a dish there that he really likes. In this case several visits to the restaurant may be
needed to ﬁnd out one’s type. This can lead to situations in which friends experiment with that
restaurant until either a majority of them likes it, or a majority of them judges unlikely that they
will ﬁnd anything like there. With this assumption, suppose that, in their ﬁrst try, only Chris
discovers that he likes the new restaurant. What eﬀect does it have on Ann and Bob? Does this
incite them to try it more or, on the contrary, prompts them to block new experimentation?
Good news for Chris reduces the risk of winner frustration for Ann and Bob, but increases the
probability of the loser trap. It turns out that good news for Chris always makes Ann and Bob
more willing to experiment, as shown in Section 4.
8Social Efficiency What would a social planner, wishing to maximize the sum of utilities of
the three friends, choose to do? Suppose that u is very close to 1, so that “winners” (those who
like the new restaurant) appreciate it only slightly more than the incumbent. Then, the only
case in which a social planner would impose the new restaurant in the long run is if all friends
turn out to be winners. If there is a loser (i.e. someone who dislikes the new restaurant), the
very small utility gain achieved by winners does not compensate the disutility experienced by the
loser. However, this policy is incompatible with majority voting, which would result in the two
winners imposing the new restaurant despite the much larger magnitude of the loss incurred by
the third, losing voter. This diﬀerence may result in all friends voting against the new restaurant
when their preferences are still unknown, due to the loser-trap eﬀect, while a social planner will
try it to see whether all friends like it. In fact, Section 5 shows that, with positive news shocks,
majority-based experimentation is always shorter than the utilitarian optimum.
3.2 Applications
The eﬀects described in this paper can arise whenever decisions are made collectively and re-
peatedly. Although the examination of any particular application is beyond the scope of this
paper, the reader may keep in mind the following contexts when thinking about the phenomena
analyzed in the following sections.
Reforms with Unknown Winners and Losers Even when they beneﬁt a signiﬁcant fraction
of the population, reforms usually harm some individuals or groups. Whenever the identity of
these losers is ex ante unknown, the “loser trap eﬀect” becomes a source of conservatism, as this
paper shows. Conservatism resulting from the interaction between preference uncertainty and
collective decisions has been studied, both empirically and theoretically, in the context of trade
liberalization.12 Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), in particular, are motivated by the behavior of
industry groups who lobby against trade reforms ex ante, but a majority of which beneﬁts from
these reforms once they are implemented. They explain this paradox by showing that reforms
having a negative expected value ex ante may turn out to be beneﬁcial to the majority once
implemented. This will be the case, for example, if a reform generates a few “losers,” whom it
severely hits, while providing small beneﬁts to a majority of “winners.” In such a scenario, when
the identity of winners and losers is a priori unknown, the reform is initially opposed by all, but
eventually gains the support of a majority as the identity of winners and losers gets revealed.
12See Baldwin (1985) and Bhagwati (1988).
9Ex Ante Public Goods Section 9 considers a general speciﬁcation of preference uncertainty
that encompasses a setting, symmetric to the benchmark setting, in which negative lump-sums
occur if the risky action is bad, while the safe action quo entails a small cost compared to
the payoﬀ of the risky action if it is good. This setting is potentially useful to think about
applications where coordination is valuable to avoid negative shocks whose eﬀects may vary
across countries in a way that is a priori unknown. One may think for example of international
coordination of security policy or greenhouse gas emissions.
In such settings, the paper predicts two opposite regimes, depending on voters’ initial beliefs. In
the ﬁrst regime, society experiments until, possibly, losers become numerous enough to impose
the safe action. In the second regime, the risk of entering the ﬁrst regime is so large ex ante
that voters reject experimentation altogether. Both regimes are socially ineﬃcient. The ﬁrst
regime pushes experimentation too far, as unsure voters ignore the disutility of losers.13 In
the second regime, voters pay a safety premium to avoid a phenomenon whose consequences
remain largely unknown. Social eﬃciency would require a collective long-term commitment to
an experimentation policy that depends on the observed consequences of the risky action. The
paper also emphasizes the distinction between commitment to an observation-dependent policy
and commitment to a ﬁxed action. Commitment to a ﬁxed action may not be suﬃcient to
increase eﬃciency, as it adds even more rigidity to the decision process.
Coordination Breakdown Winner frustration has some resemblance to the holdup problem
studied in contract theory, and can similarly lead to coordination breakdowns. At an abstract
level, an “involuntary” holdup may occur ex post if preferences concerning a joint initiative
turn out to be diﬀerent. In that case, the disappointed party can cancel the initiative at the
expense of the party who turned out to beneﬁt from it. Contrary to a standard holdup problem,
winner frustration results from revelation of preference gaps and can thus only occur through
experimentation. Winner frustration is thus better suited to capture contexts where learning is
signiﬁcant, such as joint research projects between ﬁrms, laboratories, or co-authors.
4 Benchmark Setting
The benchmark setting embeds the exponential bandit model analyzed by Keller, Rady, and
Cripps (2005) into a setting with majority voting. Time t ∈ [0,∞) is continuous and discounted
13Allowing for transfers across voters would alleviate such ineﬃciency, although the transfers would have to be
from losers to unsure voters, which may be undesirable or unethical in practice.
10at rate r > 0. There is an odd number N ≥ 1 of individuals who continually decide at the simple
majority rule which of two actions to choose. The ﬁrst action S is “safe” and yields a ﬂow s per
unit of time to all individuals. The second action R is “risky” and can be, for each player, either
“good” or “bad.” The types (good or bad) are independently distributed across the group (the
case of correlated types is considered in Section 8). If R is bad for some individual i, it always
pays him 0. If R is good for i, it pays him lump-sum payoﬀs at random times which correspond
to the jumping times of a Poisson process with constant intensity λ. The arrival of lump-sums
is independent across individuals. The magnitude of these lump sums14 equals h . If R is good
for i, the expected payoﬀ per unit of time is therefore g = λh. The assumption 0 < s < g rules
out the uninteresting case in which either R or S is dominated for all beliefs. Each individual
starts with a probability p0 that R be good for him. This probability is the same for all and is
common knowledge. Thereafter, all payoﬀs are publicly observed, so that everyone shares the
same belief about any given individual’s type (for privately observed payoﬀs, see Section 13). In
particular, the arrival of the ﬁrst lump-sum to a given individual i makes him publicly a “sure
winner”. At any time t, therefore, the group is divided into k “sure winners” for whom R is good
with probability one, and N − k “unsure voters,” who have the same probability p of having a
good type. Unsure voters’ probability evolves according to Bayes’ rule and obeying the dynamic
equation dp/dt = −λp(1 − p) if no lump-sum is observed, with pj jumping to 1 if some voter
j receives a lump sum.15 Type independence implies that an unsure voter only learns from his
payoﬀ stream but not from others’.
When N = 1, the setting reduces to the optimization problem of a single decision maker. The
optimal experimentation strategy is Markov with respect to the current belief p, determined by
a cut-oﬀ pSD such that R is played if and only if p ≥ pSD. This cut-oﬀ is determined by an
indiﬀerence condition (derived more generally in the proof of Theorem 1)
pSD =
µs
µg + (g − s)
, (1)
where µ = r/λ. Let pM = s/g denote the myopic cut-oﬀ, i.e. the probability below which R
yields a lower expected payoﬀ than S. The previous formula implies that pSD < pM. Indeed,
experimentation really only takes place for all p ∈ [pSD,pM], since the single decision maker then
chooses the risky action, despite its lower payoﬀ, in order to learn more about its true value for
future decisions. Choosing R in this range is optimal due to the option value of experimentation.
14All results hold if these lump sums have random, independently distributed magnitudes with constant mean h.
More generally, what matters to decision makers are the expected payoﬀ rates of each action and the probability
that the risky action be good or bad. See Section 9 for a general speciﬁcation of payoﬀ distributions and beliefs.
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t0: experimentation end time if no winner is observed before reaching p(0).
t1: experimentation end time if only one winner is observed before reaching p(1).
p(2) = 0: R is elected forever if winners have the majority, no matter what pt for the remaining unsure voter.
pSD < p(1): a single decision maker always experiments more than a group with a majority of unsure voters.
Figure 1: Dynamics of Collective Experimentation with 3 Voters.
For a group using the simple majority rule, the formal analysis to follow shows that collective
decisions are determined by nonincreasing cut-oﬀs {p(k)}0≤k≤N such that the risky action is
played at time t if and only if pt > p(kt), where kt is the number of sure winners at that time.
The dynamics of collective decisions can thus be described as follows. Starting with some (high
enough) level p0, R is elected until the threshold p(0) is reached, at which point experimentation
stops if no winner has been observed by then or continues until another threshold p(1) < p(0) is
reached, etc. These dynamics can are qualitatively represented by Figure 1 for the case of three
voters.
A collective decision rule, or policy, is a stochastic process C = {Ct}t≥0 adapted to the ﬁltration
generated by the arrival of voters’ lump sums and taking values in the action space {R,S}. Any










where the payoﬀ rate is dπi
S(τ) = sdτ and dπi
R(τ) = hdNi
τ or 0 depending on whether R is good
or bad for i and {Ni}1≤i≤N is a family of independent Poisson processes with intensity λ.
At any time t, within each category of voters (sure winners or unsure voters), individuals have the
12same value function since their payoﬀs are identically distributed. Let wk,C and uk,C respectively
denote the value functions of sure winners and unsure voters where superscripts indicate the
current number k of sure winners and the rule C that is followed. Letting kN = (N − 1)/2,
winners have the majority if and only if k > kN.
Definition 1 C is a Majority Voting Equilibrium (MVE) if for all t, it satisﬁes the following
conditions:



































where σ is the ﬁrst (possibly inﬁnite) time at which a new winner is observed, and θ is any
policy.
This deﬁnition means that at any time, the subgroup with the majority follows the policy that is
optimal for itself, until a change occurs in the composition of the subgroups. When unsure voters
have the majority, the conditional probability that any given unsure voter be that new winner
is simply 1/(N − kt), since there are N − kt unsure voters with identical payoﬀ distributions.
This explains the last term in (2). This deﬁnition extends to a non-Markov setting the standard
notion of majority voting equilibrium for dynamic Markov policies (see for example Roberts
(1989)). In particular, if one imposed at the outset that the collective decision rule only depend
on the state (k,p), the above equations then reduce to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equations (to be explained in detail shortly):
• If k ≤ kN, C = R if and only if
pg + λp[wC(k + 1,p) − uC(k,p)]




13• If k > kN, C = R if and only if




The equilibrium concept also corresponds, in a dynamic setting, to the elimination of weakly
dominated strategies: it is the outcome obtained if each individual, at each time, votes for the
action that maximizes his value function, given the policy, as if he were pivotal.16
Theorem 1 shows that there exists a unique17 majority voting equilibrium, that this equilibrium
has the Markov property, and that it is characterized by cut-oﬀs. Equilibrium uniqueness is
noteworthy and comes from a backward induction argument on the number of winners. Here is
some intuition for the proof, assuming for now the Markov property. At any time t the state of
the group can be summarized by kt and pt. Each voter category (sure winners or unsure voters)
consists of individuals with perfectly aligned interests. If sure winners have the majority, they
optimally impose R. If unsure voters have the majority and are very pessimistic about their
type (p near zero), they impose S. Since an unsure voter can become a winner but the reverse is
false, majority can only shift from unsure voters to winners. Starting with a majority of unsure
voters, decisions are dictated by unsure voters’ interest until they (possibly) lose the majority.
The main question is therefore to determine unsure voters’ preferences. These preferences are
assessed by the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
ru(k,p) = max{pg + λp[w(k + 1,p) − u(k,p)]






The ﬁrst part of the maximand corresponds to action R, the second to action S. The eﬀect of R
on an unsure voter i can be decomposed into four elements: i) the expected payoﬀ rate pg, ii) the
jump of the value function if i receives a lump-sum, which occurs at rate λ with probability p:
his value function jumps to w and the number of winners increases by 1, iii) the jump of i’s value
function if another unsure voter receives a lump-sum: i is still an unsure voter, but the number
of sure winners increases by 1, and iv) the eﬀect of Bayesian updating on the value function
when no lump-sum is observed. Independence of the Poisson processes governing individual
payoﬀs implies that only one lump-sum can be received during any inﬁnitesimal period of time,
16The concept rules out trivial Nash equilibria, such as equilibria in which all individuals vote for the same
dominated action. It also gets rid of some subtleties speciﬁc to continuous games identiﬁed by Simon and
Stinchcombe (1989).
17As usual for the continuous-time stochastic control literature, uniqueness of the optimal policy is understood
up to a subset of times of measure 0 on which actions can take any possible values without aﬀecting value functions.
14so that no term involving two or more jumps appears in the HJB equation. In comparison, if S
is chosen, learning stops and i simply receives payoﬀ rate s. Since unsure voters have identical
value functions, they unanimously decided to stop experimentation if p becomes too low. They
do so when the R part of (6) equals s. At such level p, the smooth pasting condition implies
that the derivative term vanishes since the value function is constant, equal to s/r, below that
level (see for example Dixit, (1993). This determines the equilibrium policy’s cut-oﬀs as state
by Theorem 1, whose proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 1 (Existence and Uniqueness) There exists a unique MVE. This equilibrium is
characterized by cut-oﬀs p(k), 0 ≤ k ≤ N, such that R is chosen in state (k,p) if and only if
p > p(k).
The next result, Theorem 2, states that these cut-oﬀs are decreasing in k: the larger the number
of winners, and the more remaining unsure voters are willing to experiment. This result is
perhaps surprising: why would unsure voters want to experiment more when the risk that they
lose majority and be imposed R forever increases? The intuition is as follows. Suppose that p
is below the myopic cut-oﬀ pM but above p(k) so that with k current winners, unsure voters
choose to experiment. By deﬁnition of pM, unsure voters get a lower immediate expected payoﬀ
rate with R than with S. Therefore, the only reason why they choose to experiment is that they
hope to become winners. Now suppose by contradiction that p(k + 1) > p(k), and that p lies
in (pk,pk+1). Then, as soon as a new winner is observed, k jumps to k + 1, which implies that
S is imposed forever, since p < pk+1. Therefore, the very reason why unsure voters wanted to
experiment, namely the hope of being winners, becomes moot: as soon as one of these unsure
voters becomes a winner, he sees the safe action imposed on him forever, which prevents him
from actually enjoying any beneﬁt of being a winner.18 Theorem 2 also states that p(k) > pSD
for all k ≤ kN: a single decision maker always experiments more than a group whose majority
consists of unsure voters. The reason is the control-sharing eﬀect mentioned in the introduction:
a single decision maker knows that if he turns out to be winner, he will be able to enjoy the
risky action, and if he turns out to be a loser, he can stop experimentation whenever he wants.
In a group, even if a voter turns out to be a winner, he is not guaranteed that the risky action
will be played forever, as a majority of unsure voters may block it. And if he turns out to be a
loser, he may still be imposed the risky action forever if experimentation lasts long enough to
reveal a majority of winners. This twofold control loss prompts unsure voters to experiment less
than anyone of them would if he could dictate decisions in the future.
18That is, apart from receiving a lump-sum at the time of jump, but the possibility of that gain is already
factored in the computation of the immediate expected payoﬀ, which is still less than s for p < p
M.
15Theorem 2 (Cut-Offs Relations) Equilibrium cut-oﬀs satisfy the following relations:
• pM > p(0).
• p(k) > p(k + 1) for k ≤ kN.
• p(kN) ≥ pSD with strict inequality if N > 1.
• p(k) = 0 for k > kN.
Proof. In the appendix.
In fact, it is possible to prove a stronger19 result than cut-oﬀ monotonicity: when a new winner
the value function of both winners and unsure voters jumps upwards, provided that k < kN. For
sure winners, this result is intuitive: a higher number of sure winners means a higher probability
that a winning majority will be achieved. To be complete, this argument also requires that
experimentation gets longer as the number of winners increases, which is guaranteed by cut-oﬀ
monotonicity of Theorem 2. More surprising is the fact that the occurrence of a new winner
results in an upward jump of unsure voters’ value function, unless this new winner is the decisive
voter that gives the majority to winners. The intuition here is that new winners reduce the risk
of winner frustration which predominates as long as unsure voters keep control of the decision
process.
Theorem 3 (Value Function Monotonicity) The following holds:
• u and w are nondecreasing in p,
• w(k,p) is nondecreasing in k for all p,
• u(k + 1,p) ≥ u(k,p) for all p, and k < kN,
• u(kN + 1,p) < u(kN,p) for all p,
• u(k,p) = pg/r and w(k,p) = g/r for all p and k > kN.
Proof. See the appendix.
19This result is use to analyze the case of privately observed payoﬀs, see Theorem 12.
16When learning is extremely fast, so that types are immediately revealed whenever R is tried, a
single-decision maker is always willing to experiment until he learns his type (almost) perfectly.20
However, this result does not extend to the case of collective experimentation: even as the time
cost of experimentation vanishes, the risk of loser trap remains. If that risk is severe enough,
society may prefer to shun the opportunity of immediate type revelation and hence of making
a perfectly informed decision (clearly what a utilitarian planner would choose!). Keeping other
parameter values ﬁxed, this will happen if the total number N of individuals is large enough
and the initial probability p is low enough: experimentation cut-oﬀs stay bounded away from 0
as learning intensity λ goes to inﬁnity, provided that N large enough. The proof is a direct
consequence of (16) in the appendix.
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Corollary 1 suggests that the total number N of individuals plays an important role on experi-
mentation. In fact. the next proposition states that with independent types, individuals behave
myopically as group size becomes arbitrarily large, electing the risky action if and only if its
expected payoﬀ is higher than S’s. To state the result, let p(k,N) denote the experimentation
cut-oﬀ when there are k winners and N overall individuals.
Proposition 1 (Group Size) p(kN,N) is nondecreasing in N. Moreover, for all k, p(k,N) →
pM as N goes to inﬁnity.
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the proposition is an immediate consequence of (15) in the appendix.
For the second part, (15) also implies that p(kN,N) → s/g = pM as N goes to inﬁnity. To
conclude the proof, observe that from Theorem 2, p(kN,N) ≤ p(k,N) ≤ pM for ﬁxed k and all
N ≥ 2k + 1. Taking the limit as N goes to inﬁnity proves the result. ￿
Figure 2 shows the numerical computation of cut-oﬀ policies for diﬀerent values of N and of
the number κ = kN + 1 − k of switches required for winners to gain the majority. In general,
cut-oﬀs p(k,N) are not monotonic with respect to group size, as can be proved by numerical
20Mathematically, this result comes from the single-decision maker cut-oﬀ equation (1): as the intensity λ goes
to inﬁnity, µ goes to 0 and so does the cut-oﬀ p
SD.




















Number of switches required to achieve a winning majority
Figure 2: Policy Cut-Oﬀs. r = 1, λ = 1, s = 1, g = 2.
counter-example. Such violations may seem counter-intuitive: as N increases, individual power
gets more diluted, so shouldn’t this reduce the value of experimentation? However, keeping
k ﬁxed, adding unsure voters increases the expected number of winners, hence the expected
duration of experimentation, keeping cut-oﬀs ﬁxed. The addition of voters thus reduces the risk
of winner frustration, which may increase the attractiveness of experimentation.
Proposition 1 is also related to power concentration. As a simple model of power concentration,
deﬁne an oligarchy as a subset of O (odd) voters such that, at any time, the collective decision is
the action chosen by the majority of that subset. Experimentation cut-oﬀs are therefore deﬁned
as before, replacing k by the number of winners within the oligarchy, and the total number of
voters by the cardinal of the oligarchy. With this interpretation, Proposition 1, conveys a sense
in which experimentation lasts longer if power is concentrated into fewer hands. In particular,
a dictator sets the same experimentation cut-oﬀ as a single decision maker.21
5 Utilitarian Policy
This section characterizes the optimal experimentation policy of a utilitarian social planner and
shows that it lasts longer than majority-based experimentation.
21This however does not hold when types are correlated, as in Section 8.
18Theorem 4 Under the utilitarian criterion, the optimal policy is determined by cut-oﬀs q(k)
such that C(k,p) = R if and only if p ≥ q(k). These cut-oﬀs are non-increasing in k, with
q(k) = 0 if




Proof. See the appendix.
The next result shows that majority experimentation is ineﬃciently short compared to the
utilitarian optimum. As the proof below illustrates, the result relies on the two eﬀects described
in the introduction: i) the social planner values information more than any individual voter,
and ii) the social planner takes into account winners utility while unsure voters don’t whenever
they impose the safe action under the majority rule.
Theorem 5 (Majoritarian vs. Utilitarian Rules) q(k) ≤ p(k) for all k ≤ kN.
Proof. The utilitarian cut-oﬀ q(k) solves







where W is the utilitarian value function, while the majority-voting cut-oﬀ, p(k), solves
pg + (N − k)λp
￿
¯ w(k + 1,p)
N − k
+
N − k − 1
N − k
¯ u(k + 1,p) − s/r
￿
= s (8)
where ¯ w and ¯ u are the value functions obtained under the majority rule. Optimality of the
utilitarian policy implies that for all k,p,
W(k,p)
N ≥ (k/N) ¯ w(k,p) + (1 − k/N)¯ u(k,p). Since
¯ w > ¯ u, this also implies that
W(k+1,p)
N > 1/(N −k) ¯ w(k + 1,p) +(1 −1/(N −k))¯ u(k +1,p), and
subsequently that the left-hand side of (7) is higher than that of (8) for given p. Therefore, the
root of the ﬁrst equation must be lower than that of the second. ￿
6 Commitment, Decision Frequencies, and Delegation
This section successively considers commitment to a state-dependent policy and commitment
to a ﬁxed action. While the ﬁrst type of commitment always increases eﬃciency, the second
prevents society from exploiting incoming information, resulting in a trade-oﬀ between value
of commitment and value of experimentation. These results can be reinterpreted in terms of
decision frequency and delegation.
19If voters are initially homogeneous and can commit to an anonymous22 policy at the outset, they
share a common objective function. Since expected payoﬀs are identical, the optimal policy also
maximizes the sum of these expected payoﬀs, i.e. utilitarian welfare. This shows the following
result.
Theorem 6 (Commitment) If voters can commit to an anonymous policy at time 0, they
choose the cut-oﬀ policy determined by cut-oﬀs {q(k)}0≤k≤N.
Theorem 6 shows that social eﬃciency can be partially restored if voters can to some extent
commit to a state dependent policy. However, such ability should not be confused with com-
mitment to a ﬁxed action, such as imposing a new rule for the next ﬁve years no matter how
well that rule performs over that period. Commitment to an action may be harmful because
too rigid. For example, consider the extreme case in which voters must initially commit to an
action for the entire time horizon. In such circumstance, the risky action is chosen if and only
if its expected payoﬀ is above the myopic cut-oﬀ. This extreme case of action commitment thus
entirely annihilates the value of experimentation.
Commitment to an action is formally equivalent to reducing the frequency of decision making.
For example, voting every ﬁve years amounts to a succession of ﬁve-year commitments. The
previous observation can therefore be reinterpreted as follows: if votes take place at a low enough
time frequency, individual control over collective decisions is reduced to such extent that the
resulting policy is more ineﬃcient.
The analysis suggests that, in the context of experimentation, commitment to a ﬁxed action
generates a trade-oﬀ between value of experimentation and value of commitment. Are there
cases where committing to a ﬁxed action is beneﬁcial? The next example answers aﬃrmatively,
provided that aggregate uncertainty is small enough and initial beliefs are optimistic enough.
With a very large (inﬁnite) population, the law of large numbers allows one to compute the
socially optimal action: starting with an individual probability p that the action is good, the
risky action is the social optimum if and only if pg > s, since there is almost surely a fraction
p of winners. Put diﬀerently, the law of large numbers implies that there is no learning at the
aggregate level. Suppose that initially pg > s. From Theorem 6, individuals ﬁnd it optimal to
commit to the risky action over the inﬁnite horizon. What happens without commitment? The
22Anonymity means that individuals cannot commit to a policy that favors or harms particular voters, such
as imposing generous redistribution if some given individuals turn out to be poor and no redistribution if these
same individuals turn out to be rich. This assumption is consistent with veil-of-ignorance arguments.
20second part of Proposition 1 implies that unsure voters, if they have the majority, impose the
safe action as soon as pt hits the myopic cut-oﬀ pM = s/g. This situation will occur almost
surely if one starts with p = pM +ε for small ε for small enough.23 This shows that commitment
to the risky action is strictly more eﬃcient than no commitment.
As another interpretation, suppose that voters can temporarily transfer the decision process to
a delegate who makes decisions based on a mixture of electoral and welfare concerns. Such
delegation can improve eﬃciency to the extent that welfare enters the delegate’s objective, as
he is able to adapt to incoming information. However, delegating action to a representative who
prefers one action over another is equivalent to commitment to a ﬁxed-action and subject to the
same rigidity.
7 Supermajority Rules
This section analyzes how the choice of a voting rule aﬀects experimentation, and shows that
there is no systematic advantage of one voting rule above another.24 As one moves across
the entire spectrum of voting rules from requiring unanimity for the safe action to requiring
unanimity for the risky action, the risk of loser trap diminishes while the risk of winner frustration
increases, with one of the two risks entirely vanishing when unanimity is required. Depending
on the parameters of the model, which determines the magnitude of these risks, the optimal rule
can be any rule in the spectrum. For simplicity, the analysis starts with the case of immediate
type revelation, which is suﬃcient to show the lack of comparability of voting rules.25
Suppose that learning is arbitrarily fast (i.e. λ → ∞). In that case, there is no time cost of
experimentation hence no winner frustration. If one requires unanimity for the risky action, this
also gets rid of loser trap so will always prompt to choose immediate type revelation. However,
once types are revealed, unanimity requires that R is only implemented if all voters are winners,
23Form Proposition 5 of the appendix, the probability that an unsure voter with initial probability p receives
a lump sum before pt reaches q < p equals (p − q)/(1 − q). This and the law of large numbers imply that, when
society starts at p
M +ε, the fraction of remaining unsure voters when p
M is reached equals 1−ε/(1−p
M), which
is greater than 1/2 for ε < (g − s)/2g.
24The analysis focuses on so-called “q-rules” or supermajority rules. If voting weights were allowed to vary with
time according to news arrival, this would amount to a form of state-dependent commitment, and could clearly
improve eﬃciency.
25For any supermajority rule one may, proceeding as in Section 4, prove the existence of a unique voting
equilibrium characterized by monotonic cut-oﬀs contained in [p
SD,p
M]. The analysis of this section, based on
immediate type revelation, does not require this proof.
21which typically is ineﬃciently too restrictive. Indeed, the social optimum is to get immediate
type revelation and then choose the risky action if and only kg > sN. For ν ∈ {1,...N}, deﬁne
the ν voting rule as the rule requiring ν votes for the risky action. Letting νU = (sN)/g, a ν
rule with ν > νU will never implement the risky action when it is socially ineﬃcient to do so.
Let ¯ ν denote the smallest integer such that society is ready to experiment with the ¯ ν voting rule,
and let ν∗ = max{¯ ν,νU}. Then, social eﬃciency is decreasing in ν for ν ≥ ν∗, because on this
range ν is high enough to prompt experimentation and the probability of implementing the risky
action if it is socially eﬃcient ex post is decreasing in ν, while the probability of implementing
the risky action if it is ineﬃcient is zero. As is easily checked, ν∗ can take any value between 1
and N (¯ ν decreases from N to 1 as p increases from 0 to 1).
To generate the reverse ineﬃciency ranking, suppose that, in addition to immediate type reve-
lation, p is close to 1. In that case, society always wishes to experiment, since the probability
of loser trap is arbitrarily small. Social eﬃciency is increasing in ν for ν ≤ νU: since p is close
to 1, initial experimentation takes place anyway, and ex post the probability of implementing
the risky action if it is socially ineﬃcient decreases in ν. Since νU can take any value between
1 and N, this implies the following result.
Theorem 7 For any voting rules ν  = ˜ ν, there exist parameter values and an initial belief p
such that the ν voting rule is strictly socially more eﬃcient than the ˜ ν voting rule.
Intuitively, eﬃciency depends not only on voters’ ex ante probability of falling in the loser trap
but also on the magnitude of the loser trap (more generally, the relative values of g and s and
0). With slower learning, the risk and magnitude of winner frustration also inﬂuences voting
rule eﬃciency in the opposite direction. The impact of magnitude, already implicit in the above
analysis through νU, is illustrated below for the comparison of the simple majority rule and the
unanimity rule for R (i.e. ν = N). Let {χ(k)}0≤k≤N denote the cut-oﬀs characterizing to the
unanimity-voting policy.
Example 1 Suppose that N = 3 and s ≪ g. Then, χ(1) > p(1).
Proof. Equation (15) in the appendix implies that
p(1) =
µs





if g ≫ s. In particular, p(1) is arbitrarily close to zero if g ≫ s. With the unanimity rule and
k = 1, unsure voters are indiﬀerent when p satisﬁes
pg + λp[w(2,p) − s/r] + λp[vSD(p) − s/r] = s, (10)
22where w(2,p) is the value of a sure winner under unanimity rule if there are two sure winners
(and N = 3), and vSD(p) is the value function of a single-decision maker. As can be easily
checked, vSD(p) ≤ pg/r + (1 − p)s/r, while w(2,p) ≤ pg/r + (1 − p)s/r. This and (10) imply
that χ(1) must satisfy the inequality




µg + 2p(g − s)
∼ s/g (11)
if g ≫ s. Comparing (9) and (11) shows that χ(1) > p(1). ￿
8 Correlation and Heterogeneity
This section considers the case of two voters, 1 and 2, who share a common belief about the initial
joint distribution of their types, although this distribution may be asymmetric and exhibit type
correlation across voters. Let θi denote Voter i’s type, and let pϑ1ϑ2 = Pr[(θ1,θ2) = (ϑ1,ϑ2),
where ϑi ∈ {g,b} describes the possible types (good or bad) of each voter. Also let pi =
Prob[θi = g] for i ∈ {1,2}, and α = pgg/(p1p2). α is a measure of the correlation between voter
types.26 Let ∆ denote the set of (p2,α) that are achievable as elementary probabilities vary
over the four-dimensional simplex. The following proposition is a simple exercise of Bayesian
updating, whose proof is easy and omitted.
Proposition 2 (State Dynamics) Beliefs are governed by the following dynamics equations.
When no lump-sum is observed,
•
dpgg
dt = −λpgg(2 − p1 − p2)
•
dpbb
dt = λpbb(p1 + p2)
•
dpgb
dt = −λpgb(1 − p1 − p2),
dpbg
dt = −λpbg(1 − p1 − p2)
• dα
dt = −λα(1 − α)(p1 + p2)
26The standard correlation measure and α have a one-to-one relationship for any given p
1 and p
2. If α = 1,
types are uncorrelated. In general, α takes values in R+, although not all values of R+ are achievable for given
p
1,p
2. For example, p
1 = 1 implies that α = 1, since in that case Voter 1’s type is deterministic hence uncorrelated
with Voter 2’s type.
23When Voter 1 receives a lump-sum,
• pbb










• α+ = 1, p1
+ = 1, p2
+ = αp2
where the subscript ‘+’ denotes values immediately after the lump-sum is observed, and its
absence denotes values immediately before the lump-sum. Symmetric formulas if instead Voter 2
receives a lump sum.
Suppose that R requires unanimity. Since voters may now be heterogeneous (i.e. p1  = p2), the
equilibrium concept must be modiﬁed. In the spirit of Section 4, and given the unanimity rule,
it is natural to assume that the voter who is the less likely of being a winner is in control: if
that voter wants to play the risky action, so should the player with a higher expected type. This
notion is also consistent with elimination of weakly dominated strategies, because the pivotal
voter is always the voter who wishes to stop experimentation. For simplicity, let us therefore
deﬁne a unanimity equilibrium (UE) as follows: at any time t, if pi ≤ pj, then j votes for R
whenever i does.
Theorem 8 There exists a unique UE. This equilibrium determined by a cut-oﬀ function δ :
∆ → [0,1] such that C(p1,p2,α) = R if and only if p1 > δ(p2,α) whenever p1 ≤ p2, with the
reverse relation if p1 > p2.
Proof. See the appendix.
Theorem 9 states that a voter’s incentive to experiment increases both with the other voter’s
probability of being a winner and with voters’ type correlation. Intuitively, if types are more
positively correlated, the risk of winner frustration decreases. The risk of winner frustration is
also lower for a given voter if the other voter is more likely to be a winner. In the extreme case in
which, say, Voter 2 is a sure winner (i.e. p2 = 1), Voter 1 has full control over collective decisions,
and can behave in eﬀect as a single-decision maker. In addition, positive correlation increases
the speed of learning, which reduces the time cost of experimentation. In the extreme case of
perfect type correlation, the setting is equivalent to one with a single decision maker with twice
the initial learning intensity. Figure 3 shows numerical computations of the experimentation
boundary for several values of the correlation measure α.
Theorem 9 δ is decreasing in both components.


















Figure 3: Experimentation Boundary δ as a function of α. r = 1, λ = 1, s = 1, g = 2.
Proof. The left-hand side of (22), is increasing in p, p2 and α. Therefore, keeping α ﬁxed, the
root δ(p2,α) must be decreasing in p2, and similarly keeping p2 ﬁxed, δ(p2,α) must be decreasing
in α. ￿
9 General News Arrival Processes
Several potential applications of this paper require a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of news arrival than
the one studied in the benchmark setting. In order to determine which of the previous results
generalize to other news arrival processes, this section reformulates the model of collective ex-
perimentation as an abstract stochastic control problem. It then reconsiders three results of
the previous sections: i) collective experimentation is shorter than the single decision maker
equivalent, ii) collective experimentation is shorter than the utilitarian optimum,27 iii) there is
always some experimentation, i.e. a set of voter beliefs where R’s immediate payoﬀs is lower
than S’s but society still elects R. The results of this section are then exploited to analyze a
27That result is considered in the negative-news setting to follow.
25setting with negative news shocks and another with mixed news shocks.
Suppose that, for any given individual, the risky arm has a payoﬀ distribution, or “type”, θ
lying in some ﬁnite set Θ. At any time, that individual’s belief about his type is summarized
by a probability distribution or “state” γ ∈ Γ, where Γ = ∆(Θ) is the set of all probability
distributions28 over Θ. The safe arm still pays a constant rate s. For a single decision maker, the
Gittins index of the risky arm is the map G : Γ → R such that, given state γ, G(γ) is the smallest












where σ is any policy, and the expectation is conditional on the current state γ and on the rate s
of the safe action.29
Now consider the case of N decision makers and let {Ft}t≥0 denote the ﬁltration generated by




∈ ΓN. In general, γ may contain information about type correlation, as
in Section 8). A policy is a process adapted to the ﬁltration {Ft}t≥0 and taking values in {S,R}.
















The inequality obtains because C is an element of the policy set over which the maximization











Inequality (12) implies that Gi
D(γ) ≥ Gi
C(γ) for all i, γ, and C, where Gi
D(γ) is i’s Gittins index
if he has dictatorial power over all decisions.
The deﬁnition of voting equilibria is extended as follows. Let ν denote any integer in {1,...,N}
Definition 2 (Voting Equilibrium) C is a ν-voting equilibrium if for all belief γ, C = S if
and only if the number of voters i such that Gi
C(γ) ≤ s is greater than or equal to ν.
28In the benchmark model, the type θ is either “good” or “bad” and the state γ is the probability p that the
type is good.
29The results of this section are easily adapted to discrete-time settings. In fact, Theorem 10 does not assume
anything about the time domain.
30In general, C depends on all voters’ types and need not be anonymous.
26The following result shows that collective experimentation is shorter than dictatorial experimen-
tation, in the following sense: if there are at least ν individuals who, taken individually, would
prefer the safe action if given dictatorial power over future decisions, then society also picks the
safe action in any ν-voting equilibrium.
Theorem 10 Suppose that C is a ν-voting equilibrium. Then, C = S whenever |{i : Gi
D(γ) ≤
s}| ≥ ν.
The proof is an immediate consequence of the general inequality Gi
D(γ) ≥ Gi
C(γ) for all i and,
C and γ.
When types are independent, Gi
D(γ) = G(γi) where G(γi) is the Gittins index of the single de-
cision maker problem with (individual) belief γi. In that case, i’s optimal policy is independent
of other individuals’ types. As a corollary of Theorem 10, therefore, collective experimentation
is shorter than in an equivalent single decision maker setting. If types are positively correlated,
however, collective experimentation can last longer than in a single-decision maker setting, as
positive type correlation increases learning speed and thus reduces the time cost of experimenta-
tion, as shown by Section 8. In contrast, collective experimentation is always shorter, even with
positive correlation, than what any voter would like if he could dictate all decisions, because a
dictator beneﬁts from the same learning speed as society, unlike a single decision maker.
In the benchmark setting, Theorem 2 showed that all cut-oﬀs were below the myopic cut-oﬀ,
meaning that there is always some experimentation. How general is this result? Are there
cases where society elects the safe action even when the risky action yields a higher payoﬀ? To
answer this question, the following deﬁnitions will be used. For any probability distribution γi
over the type space, let g(γi) = E[dπi
R/dt|γi]. g(γi) is i’ immediate expected payoﬀ rate with
action R given type distribution γi. For any individual type θi, let, slightly abusing notation,
g(θi) = g(δθi), where δθi is the Dirac distribution concentrated on type θi, denote i’s true
immediate expected payoﬀ rate with action R when his actual type is θi. Say that i is a winner
if g(θi) > s, and a loser otherwise. i is a winner if R really is optimal for him given his true
type. Θ can thus be partitioned into “good” (winner) types and “bad” (loser) types.
Definition 3 A policy C is adverse for Voter i if the set
{t : Pr[Ct = R|θi good] < Pr[Ct = R|θi bad]}
has positive Lebesgue measure.
27Adversity means that R is more likely to be chosen if i is a loser, at least for some nonzero time
set. Adversity can occur, for example, if a voter’s type is perfectly negatively correlated with a
majority of voters. The majority then blocks R whenever that voter is a winner and imposes it
when he is a loser.31
Nonnegative type correlation would, intuitively, seem to rule out adversity. However, some
perverse eﬀect may occur even in that case. For example, in a setting with both positive and
negative news shocks, unsure voters may, upon observing a sure loser, want to push experimen-
tation further as the risk of the loser trap is reduced, which adversely aﬀects this loser. Such
example is constructed in Section 11. Fortunately, adversity is ruled out by important cases,
for example when R requires unanimity, or in setting with negative news shocks only.32 Finally,
non-adversity also holds in the mixed-shocks setting of Section 11 as long as learning is fast
enough relative to voters patience.
Theorem 11 Suppose that C is a voting equilibrium for voting rule υ. Then, Gi
C(γ) ≥ g(γi)
for all i for which C is non-adverse.
Proof. See the appendix.
10 Negative News Shocks
Several applications mentioned in Section 3 require a setting with negative news shocks. To
accommodate such applications, suppose that the risky arm pays a positive constant rate if it
is good and, in addition, pays some negative lump sums according to some Poisson process if
it is bad. One may assume without loss of generality that the payoﬀ rate of S is zero, since
all payoﬀs can be translated by the same constant without aﬀecting voters’ decision problem.
The state variables are the number k of sure losers and the probability p that the arm is good
31In that case, however, majority would simply ignore i and proceed with experimentation. As a stronger case
of adversity, suppose 10 individuals face the following problem. Either they elect the safe action forever or they
try R, in which case types are immediately revealed and a dictator is randomly, uniformly chosen, such that the
dictator has an opposite type from all other voters, with a 50% chance of being a winner. Ex ante, R yields an
individual expected value of π = 1/10∗[pg +(1−p)s]+9/10∗(1−p)s = pg/10+(1−p)s (letting r = 1). On the
other hand, a voter’s probability of being a winner is p/10+(1−p)9/10 = 1/2. Choosing g = 3s, the myopic cut
oﬀ is p
M = 1/3, so p is above the myopic cut-oﬀ and yet voters prefer to avoid R since π < s. Section 11 provides
an example of endogenous adversity.
32Indeed, with negative news shocks, R is continually played, if at all, until losers gain the majority. See
Section 10.
28for unsure voters. It can be shown that the policy is also determined by cut-oﬀs ρ(k) such
that unsure voters impose the risky action if and only if p ≥ ρ(k) provided k ≤ kN, and losers
impose S when k > kN. In this setting, pt increases over time since no news is good news for
unsure voters. Therefore, the risky action can only be stopped, if used at all, when enough sure
losers are observed, either because those obtain the majority, or because the cut-oﬀ ρ(kt) jumps
over pt upon the observation of a new loser (cut-oﬀ variation is discussed below). Theorem 10
implies that, provided types are independent, ρ(k) ≥ ρSD for all k < N/2, where ρSD is the
single-decision-maker cut-oﬀ.
The equilibrium policy resulting from the majority rule is non-adverse to any voter. Indeed,
suppose that the risky action is elected by unsure voters at some time t. Then, the (possibly
inﬁnite) time at which the risky action is abandoned necessarily decreases with the number of
sure losers since as time passes, the belief of unsure voters gets better and better. Therefore,
for any unsure voter i, Pr[θi good|Ct = R] ≥ Pr[θi bad|Ct = R], which shows non-adversity of
the equilibrium policy.33 Theorem 11 then implies that all cut-oﬀs lie below the myopic cut-oﬀ.
Section 5 showed that, in the benchmark setting, majority-based experimentation is ineﬃciently
short compared to the utilitarian optimum. With negative news shocks, the reverse intuition
holds to some extent: unsure voters, ignoring losers, may push experimentation further than
a utilitarian social planner. Another eﬀect arises, with an opposite direction. The value of
experimentation is generally higher for the social planner than for any individual due to control
sharing eﬀects. For example, a social planner would always welcome immediate type revelation,
whereas voters can shun it provided the risk of loser trap is high enough. At the outset, a
social planner may thus be more willing to experiment than individual voters. As the number
of observed losers increases, the ﬁrst eﬀect starts to dominate, with the social planner stopping
experimentation before unsure voters under majority voting.
In view of Theorem 2, one may naturally wonder whether cut-oﬀs are also monotonic in this
negative news shock setting. The answer is negative. Counter-examples can be observed numer-
ically or constructed with analytical results omitted here. Such violations can be explained as
follows. Essentially, the loser trap is more severe with negative news shocks. In the benchmark
setting, unsure voters can always impose the safe action when they have the majority, and the
only shock that may occur in that case is to become a winner. With negative news shocks, in
contrast, any unsure voter can, upon receiving a negative lump-sum, suddenly join the minority
of sure losers and hence face the worst possible situation. Negative news is compounded by a
33See the proof of Theorem 11 for the equivalence between this statement and non-adversity.
29sudden control loss. This explains why the “insurance” eﬀect resulting from the apparition of a
new loser can, paradoxically, encourage experimentation. Seen diﬀerently, in the negative-news
setting, p simply increases over time, which is enough to make experimentation more attrac-
tive. In contrast, in the positive-news setting, the apparition of news winners is necessary for
experimentation to continue, for otherwise, p decreases until it causes experimentation to stop.34
11 Mixed Shocks and Negative Value of Experimentation
Suppose that the benchmark setting is modiﬁed as follows: if R is good, it pays positive lump
sums according to the jumping times of some Poisson process with intensity λg, and if it is bad,
it pays negative lump sums according to the jumping times of a Poisson process with intensity
λb. Without loss of generality, also suppose that the payoﬀ rate of S is zero. In this case, state
variables consist of the number kW of observed winners, the number kL of observed losers, and
unsure voters’ probability p that R is good for them. Since the number of revealed winners
and losers can only increase over time, a backward induction argument on kW and kL shows
that there exists a unique majority voting equilibrium policy. If λg > λb, then no news is bad
news, since shocks are more likely to happen if R is good than if it is bad. This implies that,
under this assumption, unsure voters become more pessimistic over time35, and that they stop
experimentation at some cut-oﬀs p(kW,kL), provided they are pivotal. Theorem 10 implies that
pSD ≤ p(kW,kL), where pSD is single decision maker setting cut-oﬀ. This inequality holds for
all ν voting rules. If the risky action requires the unanimity rule, then Theorem 11 implies
that p(kW,kL) ≤ pM, where pM is the myopic cut-oﬀ: unanimity guarantees at least some
experimentation.
Negative Value of Experimentation With other voting rules, non-adversity need not hold,
due to the following perverse eﬀect: if a loser is observed, this may prompt other voters to
experiment more by reducing their risk of the loser trap. The value of experimentation can be
negative, i.e. voters may prefer to elect the safe action even if the risky action has a higher
immediate expected payoﬀ. Here is such an example. There are three unsure voters, voting at
the simple majority rule. If a loser is observed, the remaining two unsure voters are “protected”:
it is as if R required unanimity among them two. This increases their willingness to experiment.
34From a technical viewpoint, another distinctive feature of the negative-news settings is that the smooth-
pasting property does not hold any more. Indeed, as time elapses, p moves away from its threshold p(k), so the
value function need not be smooth at that cut-oﬀ. Instead, cut-oﬀs are determined by direct comparison of value
functions with and without starting experimentation.
35Precisely, one may show that dp/dt = −(λg − λb)p(1 − p).
30If a winner is observed, the remaining two unsure voters are now on the brink: any winner
among them will impose the risky action to the other. This risk reduces their willingness to
experiment. Therefore, ex ante, the three voters know that if any of them turns out to be a
winner, other voters will soon revert to the safe action, while if one of them receives a negative
lump-sum, others will experiment more. This endogenous adversity makes R unattractive even if
its expected payoﬀ is higher than S’s. For the value of experimentation to be negative, it requires
that i) the magnitude of loser trap be severe, and ii) learning be slow, so that experimentation
takes time and the adversity described above lasts long. Let g > 0 and b < 0 the expected payoﬀ
rates of the risky arm for sure winners and sure losers respectively. Let pM, pSD, pL, pW, p3,
respectively denote the myopic cut-oﬀ, the single decision maker cut-oﬀ, the two unsure voters’
cut-oﬀ when the third voter is a loser, the two unsure voters’ cut-oﬀ when the third voter is
a winner, and the experimentation cut-oﬀ when all three voters are unsure. For the following
parameter values g = .1, b = −1, s = 0, r = 1, λb = .1, λg = .11, cut-oﬀs have the following
values:
pM pSD pL pW p3
.9091 .9001 .9016 .9083 .9095
The most important result is that p3 > pM: voters stop experimentation at a probability level
where R’s expected payoﬀ is strictly above S’s. As explained above, pL is much lower than pW,36
meaning that if a voter is a loser, experimentation lasts much longer than if he is a winner.
As learning becomes faster (relative to patience), however, an argument similar in spirit to non-
adversity implies that the value of experimentation is positive. Indeed, suppose that either λb
or λg is arbitrarily large, so that R (almost) immediately reveals voter types. The expected
value of the risky action for any unsure voter i, given that unsure voters are ex ante pivotal (i.e.
max{kW,kL} < N/2), is

















+) denotes the number of winners after all types are revealed. Clearly,
Pr[θi good|kW
+ > N/2] > Pr[θi good] > Pr[θi good|kL
+ > N/2]. This implies that
V i > g/rPr[θi good] + b/rPr[θi bad] = pg/r + (1 − p)b/r,
which is the myopic payoﬀ. Therefore, Voter i is willing to experiment at least until p drops
below the myopic cut-oﬀ pM, deﬁned by pMg/r + (1 − pM)b/r = s = 0.
36Indeed, p
L is close to the single decision maker cut-oﬀ, while p
W is close to the myopic cut-oﬀ.
3112 Privately Observed Payoﬀs
Previous sections assumed that all payoﬀs were publicly observable. What happens if payoﬀs
are privately observed? Perhaps surprisingly, this need not aﬀect the equilibrium policy in the
context of Section 4. The intuition has two parts. Suppose voters can communicate their types,
through their voting decisions or through cheap talk. Winners always beneﬁt from revealing their
type because this increases experimentation, by the cut-oﬀ monotonicity result of Theorem 2.
Unsure voters cannot gain by manipulating the choice process because, conditional on being
pivotal (i.e. k ≤ kN), they are already choosing their optimal action.
Voters can resort to several channels to communicate their type. Cheap talk is one possibility.
Voters can simply communicate through their votes. Here is a natural protocol: each time
a cut-oﬀ is reached at which unsure voters would want to stop given the number of winners
that they last observed, unsure voters vote for the safe action and sure winners vote for the
risky action. That way, everyone observes the current number of winners, and unsure voters
can thereafter decide whether to pursue experimentation to the next cut-oﬀ (everyone votes for
the risky action), or impose the safe action (unsure voters vote for the safe action). With this
protocol, voters know the current number of winners only when p reaches particular cut-oﬀs,
but that suﬃces to implement the policy of the public-information setting.37
The proof that the above protocol implements the public-information policy is sketched in the
appendix.
Theorem 12 The above protocol yields the same equilibrium as the experimentation policy based
on publicly observed payoﬀs.
13 Extensions and Discussion
Multiple Risky Actions
With multiple correlated risky actions, even a small probability of modiﬁcation in the preference
ranking of some voter can create a disagreement among members who could otherwise impose
a better action for themselves.
37Other less natural protocols would be more informative, for example if a new winner reveals his type change
by voting for S for an inﬁnitesimal amount of time.
32Consider three individuals voting at the majority rule. Suppose for now that there are two
actions: S pays a constant rate s = 1 to all. R pays a certain rate of 2 to Voters 1 and 2, but
has an uncertain payoﬀ distribution for Voter 3: with probability p it gives oﬀ lump-sums to
Voter 3 with expected payoﬀ is g = 0.1, and gives 0 otherwise. There is a unique equilibrium:
Voters 1 and 2 impose R forever, independently of p. For what follows, it is worth noting that,
even if p were equal to 1, Voter 3 would prefer S.
Now suppose that there is another risky action, X, such that i) X is good for Voters 2 and 3
if and only if R is good for Voter 3, ii) X surely pays −9 to Voter 1, and has expected payoﬀs
g2
X = 2.1 and g3
X = 1.1 respectively to Voters 2 and 3 if it is good. Perfect correlation implies
that any lump-sum observed by Voters 2 or 3 with action X or by Voter 3 with action R causes
the common probability p to jump to 1.
To avoid ties, let us assume that S is imposed whenever no action receives a majority of votes.
The following propositions show the impact on equilibrium of preference uncertainty. The proof
of Proposition 3 is easy, as there is no learning, and omitted.
Proposition 3 If p = 0 or p = 1, there is a unique MVE: if p = 0 R is played forever, if p = 1,
X is played forever.
For the next result, suppose that µ = r/λ = 1.
Proposition 4 If p ∈ (0.1,0.8), there is a unique MVE. In this MVE, S is played forever.













= 0.1. Thus if p is greater than p
¯
, Voter 1 prefers the low payoﬀ of S rather
than risking that Voters 2 and 3 discover that X is good for them and imposing it forever, from
Proposition 3. Voter 3’s indiﬀerence equation relative to actions X and S is
p1.1 + λp[1.1/r − 1/r] = 1,
which yields ¯ p = µ/(0.1 + 1,1µ) = 0.8 if µ = 1. Therefore, if p ∈ (.1,.8), S is the preferred
choice for 1 and 3, hence chosen forever. ￿
An illustration: the Singaporean Restaurant To illustrate the content of these proposi-
tions, consider a variation of the restaurant example of Section 3. Three friends, Chris, Ian, and
33Paul go the restaurant once every week-end, and choose each time their restaurant according to
the majority rule. They start with the following preferences. Chris likes Chinese cuisine above
anything else. Ian likes Indian cuisine but not Chinese one. Paul does not know Asian cuisine,
and is thus uncertain about his preferences. There are three restaurants in town: i) a gourmet
Chinese restaurant, clearly the best choice for those who like Chinese cuisine, ii) a Singaporean
restaurant whose menu contains both Chinese and Indian dishes, and iii) a plain restaurant who
has a well known common, relatively low value to all friends.
The following paradox may occur. When given the choice among the three restaurants, Ian and
Paul impose the plain restaurant. However, if the gourmet Chinese restaurant closes down so
that only two restaurants remain, Chris and Ian impose the Singaporean restaurant.
Why did Ian change his vote? In both cases, Ian prefers the Singaporean restaurant. However, if
he agrees with Chris to go there, he runs the risk that Paul discovers that likes Chinese cuisine,
resulting in Chris and Paul to impose the gourmet Chinese restaurant in the future. If this
risk is high enough, Ian prefers to vote for the plain restaurant, which Paul also prefers if his
expected value for Asian cuisines is low enough.
Factions and Heterogeneous Voting Weights. Given the results of this paper, it is natural
to expect that voters with more decision weight will be more inclined to experiment longer.
Although a detailed analysis of voting weights requires a separate paper, one already observe
some important diﬀerence with the benchmark setting. Suppose that there are four voters with
Voter 1 having two votes and made at the simple majority rule. Suppose that Voter 4 is the
only sure winner so far. Then, Voter 1 can impose experimentation by siding with Voter 4. As
long as no other winner is observed, Voter 1 can push experimentation up to the single decision
maker threshold. If, say, Voter 2 becomes a winner, Voter 1 must then consider the risk that
Voter 3 also becomes a winner resulting in a winning coalition that imposes R forever. Contrary
to the benchmark setting, thus, experimentation can be interrupted by the occurrence of a new
winner.
Why not a two-period model? Some results of this paper can be derived in a two period
model. However, several key results of the paper, such as cut-oﬀ monotonicity, the impact of
type correlation, and the possibility of a negative value of experimentation, rely on the impact of
one’s experimentation on other voters’ future experimentation, so require at least three periods.
In that case, an inﬁnite horizon model may actually be simpler by virtue of time-homogeneity.
Time-homogeneity also guarantees that cut-oﬀs only depend on current beliefs about action
value, not on proximity to the end of time. More generally, the paper analyzes reforms or
34projects where uncertainty is revealed gradually over time, so that one is interested in the impact
of news arrival on decisions. Finally, some potential applications, such as joint R&D projects,
can be seen as stopping games, where the time extension is an important part of the model.
Some of the results in this paper can be interpreted as comparative statics about stopping.38
Risk aversion. The analysis above does not require risk neutrality: it is enough that voters
have a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, where lump sums actually correspond to
“lump utils”, or certainty equivalents thereof if the magnitude of these lump utils is random.
Side payments. In a separate paper, I show how side-payments restore utilitarian eﬃciency
in general experimentation settings with two actions (possibly both risky).
Switching costs. With a safe and a risky action, switching costs are easily accommodated,
because the equilibrium policy can only switch actions once, from the risky to the safe action.
Adding a cost there simply reduces the value of experimentation ex ante and, once the risky
action is started, modiﬁes indiﬀerence cut-oﬀs.
Two risky actions. Using a safe and a risky action provides an ideal setting to analyze
conservatism: conservatism means choosing the safe action when the risky action would be more
eﬃcient. With two risky actions, conservatism could still be interpreted as settling ineﬃciently
too early on one of the two risky actions when it would be more eﬃcient to continue learning
about the other action’s value. In this spirit, Albrecht, Anderson, and Vroman (2007) show
in their model of search by committees that collective search settles earlier (i.e. acceptance
thresholds are lower) than in the equivalent single-decision-maker setting.
Voter heterogeneity. What happens if unsure voters have heterogeneous type probabilities?
As suggested by Section 8 for the case of two voters, heterogeneity may increase experimentation.
Heterogeneity concentrates more power in the hands of those voters who are pivotal today,
because they are more likely to be also pivotal in the future. To illustrate with an extreme
case, suppose that there are 9 voters, 4 of which are (almost) sure to be winners and 4 of which
are (almost) sure to be losers. The remaining voter has (almsot) perfect control over collective
decision today, but also in the future: he will be able to side with whichever group corresponds
to his preferred action.
38Choosing λ = ∞ in eﬀect reduces the model to two periods: before and after type revelation. That simplicity
is used in Section 7.
3514 Conclusion
In a dynamic setting, collective decisions tend to be too conservative compared to what any
individual would choose if he had full control over future decisions. This control sharing eﬀect
can be decomposed into “loser trap” and “winner frustration” risks. Experimentation through
voting exhibits a systematic conservative bias compared to the utilitarian optimum. This bias
dominates when types are revealed fast enough, since a utilitarian planner facing lower time-
cost of experimentation always wants to learn those types, whereas individuals may vote against
uncovering the heterogeneity associated with unknown alternatives. That bias, however, coexists
with another eﬀect, whereby a pivotal group ignores the beneﬁts or costs of the risky action
incurred by remaining voters and, as a result, can impose more or less experimentation than is
socially optimal. Control sharing eﬀects may result in a collective experimentation policy that is
adverse to all voters, even when types are independent. In such case, the value of experimentation
is negative: society may reject a risky action whose expected payoﬀ is higher than the status
quo. Which voting rule performs better depends on the relative salience of loser trap vs. winner
frustration: the higher the risk of loser trap and the more restrictive access to R should be.
Commitment to a state-dependent policy restores full eﬃciency, but commitment to a ﬁxed
action may only increase eﬃciency if aggregate uncertainty is small enough. For large groups,
control sharing eﬀects can entirely annihilate the value of experimentation, causing individuals
to vote myopically, but are reduced if actual preferences types are positively correlated. Section 9
shows how to reformulate the analysis as an abstract stochastic control problem, using a concept
similar to the Gittins index, to allow for general news arrival processes. This formulation provides
more insight and generality to several results of the paper. For some applications, such as the
coordination of gas emission policies, it would be useful to modify the model of this paper to
accommodate partial action irreversibility. The eﬀects identiﬁed in this paper will also matter for
such settings and can be summarized by the following rule of thumb: collective experimentation
increases with the likelihood that future decisions will favor current pivotal voters.
3615 Appendix
15.1 Proof of Theorem 1













The (essentially) unique solution is Cτ = R for all τ, since it provides winners at any time with
the maximal possible expected payoﬀ g. This gives them the constant value function wN
t = g/r.
The value function of unsure voters is also easily computed: if an unsure voter’s type is good,
which happens with probability pt, he gets the same expected value as winners, g/r. Otherwise,
he gets 0 forever. Therefore, uN












where I use the fact that wN
t = g/r. Again, the (essentially) unique solution is Cτ = R for all
τ, value functions still equal wN−1
t = g/r and uN−1
t = ptg/r. By the same induction argument,
Cτ = R and wk
t = g/r and uk
t = ptg/r for all k > kN. Now consider the case k = kN, in
which unsure voters have the majority, but only one new winner among them is needed for the

























using the relations wkN+1 = g/r and ukN+1 = ptg/r. The optimization problem (14) is formally
identical to the optimization problem of a single decision maker, with known termination values.
The solution of such problem is well known (see for example Fleming and Soner, 1993). The
control is Markov in p, with any indiﬀerence threshold p(kN) determined by the smooth-pasting
condition of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (6), which reduces to
pg + pλ(g/r − s/r) + pλ(N − kN − 1)(pg/r − s/r) = s, (15)
using the relation ukN+1(p) = pg/r. The left-hand side of (15) is increasing in p, equal to 0 if




µg + (g − s) + (N − kN − 1)(p(kN)g − s)
. (16)
37This shows that C(p,kN) = R if and only if39 p > p(kN). If p ≤ p(kN), S is chosen by unsure
voters. Since no more learning occurs, p remains constant forever, hence S is played forever. The
above strategy entirely determines the value functions wC(kN,p) and uC(kN,p) of sure winners































for p ≥ p(kN), where Ω(p) = (1 − p)/p. These functions are easily shown to be increasing in p,
with uC(kN,p) ≥ pg/r. Moreover, u(kN,p) = wC(kN,p) = s/r for p ≤ p(kN), since the status
quo is imposed forever.
Now suppose that k = kN − 1. Then, any new winner results in the case k = kN just analyzed.
Again, (2) is formally equivalent to the stochastic control problem of a single decision maker.
Using again the smooth pasting property in (6), which implies that the derivative of the value
function vanishes, any indiﬀerence threshold p(kN − 1), must solve
pg + pλ(w(kN,p) − s/r) + pλ(N − kN − 2)(u(kN,p) − s/r) = s. (19)
Since the left-hand side is increasing in p, equal to 0 for p = 0 and above s for p = 1, the
equation has a unique root p(kN − 1). The choice rule thus deﬁned entirely determines value
functions u(kN − 1, ) and w(kN − 1, ).
To show that p(kN − 1) > p(kN), suppose that the contrary holds. Then, u(kN,p(kN − 1)) =
w(kN,p(kN −1)) = u(kN −1,p(kN −1)) = s/r, and by the smooth-pasting property,
∂uC
∂p (kN −
1,p(kN − 1)) = 0. Therefore, (19) becomes p(kN − 1)g = s, which contradicts the assumption
that p(kN − 1) ≤ p(kN) < pM. Thus, necessarily, p(kN) < p(kN − 1).
Let us now show that u(kN − 1,p) is nondecreasing in p. Suppose that pt = ˜ p > ¯ p and that
unsure voters behave as if pt were equal to ¯ p, meaning that they will stop experimenting after the
same amount of time σS, unless a new winner is observed σW. Until σ = min{σS,σW}, unsure
voters receive nothing since R is played and no new winner is observed. The value function of








N − kN + 1
(w(kN,pσ) + h) +
N − kN
N − kN + 1
u(kN,pσ)
￿





39As before, this is up to action changes on a time subset of measure 0.
38where q = Prob[σW < σS|pt]. We saw that u(kN, ) and w(kN, ) are increasing in p. Moreover,
these values are above s/r. Indeed, s/r is the value achieved if voters chose the status quo, which
is suboptimal by deﬁnition of σS and given that p(kN) < p(kN − 1). Also, pσ is increasing in pt
given the Bayesian updating dynamics. Finally, σW is decreasing in pt, since a higher pt makes
it more likely that a payoﬀ will be observed.40 This also implies that q is increasing in pt by
deﬁnition of q and the fact that σS is independent of pt by construction. Combining the above
implies that u(˜ p) > u(¯ p). Since unsure voters optimize their value function with respect to σS,
this yields u(kN −1, ˜ p) ≥ u(˜ p) > u(¯ p) = u(kN −1, ¯ p), which proves monotonicity of u(kN −1, ).
w(kN − 1, ) is also increasing in pt. Indeed, let σ1 < σ2 the arrivals times of lump-sum to the
next two new winners. As is easily shown, these stopping times are decreasing in pt, in the sense
of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. This, given the ﬁxed experimentation thresholds p(kN) and
p(kN − 1), implies that the distribution of the (possibly inﬁnite) stopping time σS at which














this shows that w(kN−1, ) is increasing in pt. The remaining of the proof proceeds by backward
induction on k, where the induction hypothesis is that i) for all k′ > k, C(k′,p) = R if and only
if p > p(k′), where ii) p(k′) is non-increasing for k′ > k, and iii) the resulting value functions
u(k′, ) and w(k′, ) are non-decreasing in p. The general induction step is then proved exactly
as above.
15.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 1 already shows that p(k) = 0 for k > kN. The fact that p(kN) ≥ pSD with strict
inequality if N > 1 comes from the comparison of (16) and (1). Monotonicity of p(k) is part
of the induction in the proof of Theorem 1. There remains to show that pM > p(0). The
indiﬀerence condition for p(0) is
p(0)g + p(0)λ(w(1,p(0)) − s/r) + p(0)λ(N − 1)(u(1,p(0)) − s/r) = s. (20)
Since p(0) > p(1), unsure voters strictly prefer experimentation at p = p(0) when k = 1.
Therefore, u(1,p(0)) > s/r. Since winners always get a higher expected payoﬀ than losers no
matter what action is chosen, w(1,p(0)) ≥ u(1,p(0)). Therefore, the second and third terms
40Conditional on pt, σW is the mixture of exponential variables with intensity λj, j ∈ {0,...,N −kN +1}, with
mixture weights {ρj} corresponding to the binomial distribution B(N − kN + 1,pt). Monotonicity is in the sense
of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.
39on the left-hand side of (20) are positive, which implies that p(0)g < s, or equivalently that
p(0) < pM.
15.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Monotonicity of u and w with respect to p was shown as part of the induction hypothesis
in the proof of Theorem 1. If k > kN R is elected forever since winners have the majority.
This determines value functions for this case and yields the last claim. To show monotonicity
in k of w for k ≤ kN, we proceed by induction. Clearly, g/r = w(kN + 1,p) ≥ w(kN,p).
Suppose that w(k,p) ≤ w(k + 1,p). We need to show that w(k − 1,p) ≤ w(k,p). Let φ(p) =
w(k + 1,p) − w(k,p) ≥ 0 and ψ(p) = w(k,p) − w(k − 1,p). Since p(k − 1) ≥ p(k), ψ(p) ≥ 0 for
p ≤ p(k − 1). Recall the dynamic equation of w for p ≥ p(k − 1) and ˜ k ≥ k − 1:
−rw(˜ k,p) + λ(N − ˜ k)p(w(˜ k + 1,p) − w(˜ k,p)) − λp(1 − p)
∂w
∂p
(˜ k,p) + g = 0.
Taking the diﬀerence of the resulting equations for ˜ k = k,k − 1 and rearranging terms yields
(r + λp(N − k + 1))ψ(p) = λp(N − k)φ(p) − λp(1 − p)ψ′(p).
Suppose φ is nonnegative by induction hypothesis, the previous equation can be rewritten as
ψ′(p) ≤ α(p)ψ(p) for function α. A direct application of Gronwall’s inequality along with
ψ(p(k − 1)) ≥ 0 proves that ψ is nonnegative, completing the induction step.
To show monotonicity of u with respect to k ≤ kN, ﬁx some k ≤ kN. The dynamic equation of
u for p ≥ p(k − 1) and ˜ k ≥ k − 1 is
−ru(˜ k,p)+λp(w(˜ k+1,p)−u(˜ k,p))+λp(N−˜ k−1)(u(˜ k+1,p)−u(˜ k,p))−λp(1−p)
∂u
∂p
(˜ k,p)+pg = 0.
Let φ(p) = u(k + 1,p) − u(k,p), φw(p) = w(k + 1,p) − w(k,p), and ψ(p) = u(k,p) − u(k − 1,p).
Taking the diﬀerence of the previous equation for ˜ k = k,k − 1 and rearranging terms yields:
(r + λp(N − k + 1))ψ(p) = λp[φw(p) + (N − k − 1)φ(p)] − λp(1 − p)ψ′(p). (21)
We already know that φw is positive. Therefore, if φ were also nonnegative, the argument we just
used for w would also show that ψ is nonnegative. In particular, if one can show that u(kN,p) ≥
u(kN −1,p), a backward induction will prove the result for all k ≤ kN. Combining (17) and (18)
implies that, for k = kN,
φw(p)+(N−kN−1)φ(p) =










40Therefore, the left-hand side has the sign of g −s−(N −kN −1)(s−p(kN)g). From the cut-oﬀ
formula (15), this latter term has the same sign as s − p(kN)g, which is positive. Therefore, we
can apply the ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of 21 is nonnegative for k = kN, which implies
that ψ is nonnegative for k = kN. This ﬁlls the missing step of the induction, concluding the
proof that u is increasing in k for k ≤ kN.
To show the last statement, observe that u(kN + 1,p) = pg/r from Theorem 1, and that
u(kN,p) > pg/r, from (18).
15.4 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, proceeding by backward induction on the number k
of winners. For k ≥ ¯ k, the utilitarian optimum is to choose R forever even if p = 0, since
sure winners’ gains from R outweigh the aggregate gain from S even if all unsure voters get





r . Consider next k = ¯ k−1. Let wC(k,p) and uC(k,p) denote the value
functions of sure winners and unsure voters if policy C is used, given that R is played forever if
a new winner is observed, and let WC(k,p) = kwC(k,p) + (N − k)uC(k,p), denote utilitarian















where σ is the ﬁrst (possibly inﬁnite) time at which a new winner is observed, and where
W
kt+1,C
σ = W(¯ k,pσ), the welfare that was computed earlier for k = ¯ k. This is a standard
control problem, whose solution is Markov. The indiﬀerence boundary must satisfy the smooth
pasting condition
kg + (N − k)pg + (N − k)λp
￿







which has a unique root q(k), since the left-hand side is increasing in p, greater than Ns if p = 1
and less than Ns for p = 0, by deﬁnition of ¯ k. Therefore, C(k,p) = R if and only if p ≥ q(k).
This entirely determines w(k, ), u(k, ) and W(k, ), which are easily shown to be increasing in
p. The remaining of the proof proceeds by backward induction on k as in Theorem 1, where
the induction hypothesis is that i) for all k′ > k, C(k′,p) = R if and only if p > q(k′), where ii)
q(k′) is non-increasing for k′ > k, and iii) resulting value functions w(k′, ), u(k′, ), and W(k′, )
are non-decreasing in p.
4115.5 Probability of receiving a lump sum between p and q < p
Let pS denote the probability that an individual with initial probability p of being a winner
receives a lump-sum by the time his belief has dropped to q < p.
Proposition 5 pS = (p − q)/(1 − q).
Proof. From the Bayesian updating equation, pt = (pe−λt)/((1 − p) + pe−λt).Therefore, q is
reached at a time T such that e−λT = Ω(p)/Ω(q), where Ω(p) = (1 − p)/p. Conditional on
the individual being a winner, the probability of getting a lump-sum before time T is simply
1−e−λT, since the arrival rate is an exponential random variable with parameter λ. Combining
the previous formulas concludes the proof. ￿
15.6 Proof of Theorem 8
First suppose that p2 = 1. Then voter 1 has full control over the collective decision. He therefore
imposes his optimal policy, which is that of a single decision maker. This deﬁnes δ(1,1) = pSD.
This also fully determines the value functions of both voters in that case. Let p  → w(p) denote
the value function of voter 2, where p is voter 1’s probability of being a winner is p, and vSD is
the value function of a single decision maker, which is also voter 1’s value function in this case.
More generally suppose that at time 0, p1
0 ≤ p2
0. It follows from Proposition 2 that p1
t ≤ p2
t for
all t preceding the ﬁrst arrival of a lump-sum. In particular, this implies that 1 has full control















where, letting σi denote the (possibly inﬁnite) time at which i receives his ﬁrst lump sum,
σ = min{σ1,σ2} and q = Prob[σ1 < σ2]. This is a standard control problem, whose solution is
known to be Markov. Voter 1 is indiﬀerent between R and S at probability level p, if p solves
the equation
pg + λp[w(αp2) − s/r] + λp2[vSD(αp) − s/r] = s. (22)
The left-hand side is increasing in p, equal to 0 for p = 0 and greater than g > s if p = 1.
Therefore, it has a unique root δ(p2,α). This shows that C(p1,p2,α) = R if and only if p1 >
δ(p2,α). The case p1 > p2 obtains by symmetry.
4215.7 Proof of Theorem 11













where expectations are conditioned on γ.
E[dπi
Ct(t)] = Pr[Ct = S]sdt + Pr[Ct = R]E[dπi
Ct(t)|Ct = R]
Therefore, if E[dπi
Ct(t)|Ct = R] > sdt for all t, then V i
C > s/r, implying that Gi
C(γ) > s.
Suppose that s < g(γi). Then, by deﬁnition of g( ) and by the fact that the probability of each
type is a martingale, E[dπi
R(t)] = g(γi)dt > sdt. Moreover, C’s non-adversity with respect to
i implies that E[dπi
Ct(t)|Ct = R] ≥ E[dπi
R(t)] as will be shown shortly. This inequality implies
that Gi
C(γ) > s for all s < g(γi), which concludes the proof. To show the inequality, observe that,
by Bayes’ rule, C is non-adverse for i if and only if Pr[θi good|Ct = R] ≥ Pr[θi good|Ct = S]
for almost all t.41 Moreover,
E[dπi
Ct(t)|Ct = R] = Pr[θi good|Ct = R]E[dπi
Ct(t)|Ct = R,θi good]
+ Pr[θi bad|Ct = R]E[dπi
Ct(t)|Ct = R,θi bad]. (24)
Combining these results yields the inequality.
15.8 Proof of Theorem 12 (Sketch)
For sure winners, voting R forever is optimal as it maximizes their immediate payoﬀ as well as
the length of experimentation, due to the cut-oﬀ monotonicity established in Theorem 2. Under
the protocol described in Section 12, unsure voters only observe the state k when particular cut-
oﬀs are reached. Let l denote the number of winners that was last revealed. For p > p(l), unsure
voters only know that the number ˜ k of current winners is greater than or equal to l. Unsure
voters are only pivotal if ˜ k ≤ kN. By Theorem 3, u(¯ k,p) ≥ u(l,p) for l ≤ ¯ k ≤ kN. Therefore,
E[u(˜ k,p)|l ≤ ˜ k ≤ kN] ≥ u(l,p) > s/r for p > p(l). Therefore, it is optimal for unsure voters
to choose the risky action whenever indicated by the protocol, conditional on being pivotal. If,
upon reaching p(l), it turns out that k = l, i.e. no new winner has been observed since the last
release of public information, then it is optimal for unsure voters to stop: their value function
is identical to the benchmark case, equal to s/r.
41Precisely, we have for all t, Pr[Ct = R|good] ≥ Pr[Ct = R|bad] ⇔ Pr[Ct = R|good] ≥ Pr[Ct = R] ⇔
Pr[good|Ct = R] ≥ Pr[good] ⇔ Pr[good|Ct = R] ≥ Pr[good|Ct = B].
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